

Message Text

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47/11

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 /026 W

----- 099144

O 030700Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2580

INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 LUSAKA 0008

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (LISBON ADDED AS INFO ADDRESSEE)J

EXDIS

DAKAR FOR ASST SECTY SCHAUFEL

EO 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, ZA

SUBJECT: ZAMBIAN APPEAL TO SOVIETS TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT OF
UNITY IN ANGOLA

1. SUMMARY: CHONA CALLED FROM STATE HOUSE SEVERAL TIMES DURING
THE DAY TO ASK IF I COULD STAND BY FOR A MEETING, TWICE SET TIMES
WHICH WERE CANCELLED, AND FINALLY FIXED LATE EVENING APPOINT-
MENT JANUARY 2 IN WHICH HE: A)DEBRIEFED ME ON HIS SECOND AND
LATEST CONVERSATION DAY BEFORE WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON
ENDING WAR AND WORKING TOWARD UNIFIED GOVERNMENT IN ANGOLA;
B) PROPOSED SECRETARY MAKE LAST MINUTE APPEAL TO OAU SECRETARY
ON EVE OF OAU SUMMIT; AND C) SOUGHT USG OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON
ZAMBIAN DRAFT FOR SUMMIT. END SUMMARY

2. UNDER ORDERS FROM PRESIDENT CHONA SAID HE SUMMONED SOVIET
AMBASSADOR BELAKOLOS TO STATE HOUSE NEW YEAR'S DAY IN SPIRIT
OF APPEASEMENT TO SEEK CLEAR DEFINITION FROM RUSSIANS OF THEIR
SECRET

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OBJECTIONS IN ANGOLA. DID SOVIETS SEEK COMPLETE MILITARY VICTORY
IN ANGOLA AND BLANKET DEFENSE AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH
WOULD SUBJUGATE ANGOLAN PEOPLE UNDER DOMINANCE OF MPLA?
CHONA SAID SOVIETS REPLIED NEGATIVELY. WHAT THEN DID RUSSIANS

DESIRE? PEACE, UNITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF COUNTRY AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, WAS SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S REPLY. DID RUSSIANS THEN THINK IT RIGHT THAT ARMS WHICH THEY HAD SUPPLIED SHOULD BE USED TO KILL ANGOLANS WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE VOICE IN THEIR FUTURE?

3. IF SOVIET OBJECTIVE WAS AS STATED, THEN THESE PEOPLE, NOT NECESSARILY THEIR LEADERS, CHONA ARGUED, SHOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO GOVERN THEMSELVES. UNDER ALVOR, MOMBASA AND NAKURU AGREEMENTS ALL THREE ANGOLAN MOVEMENTS WERE RECOGNIZED EACH BY THE OTHER AND TO NO ONE WAS DOMINANCE IMPUTED. CHONA CONCLUDED BY ASKING SOVIETS TO ACKNOWLEDGE RIGHTNESS OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID HE IMPRESSED WITH COMPELLING LOGIC OF CHONA'S ASSESSMENT AND COULD HARDLY OBJECT, BUT OF COURSE HE ASSUMED IT MEANT MPLA WOULD LEAD ANY SUCH GOVERNMENT. WAS THIS CORRECT?

4. CHONA SAID HE BENT OVER BACKWARDS TO EXPLAIN TO RUSSIAN THAT THERE WAS LONG, HISTORIC KINSHIP BETWEEN MPLA AND UNIP, SOMETHING LIKE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNIP AND BRITISH LABOR PARTY (IN FACT, NETO HAD EVEN SENT A NEW YEARS GREETING TO KAUNDA), BUT IN THIS CASE NEITHER SOVIETS, NOR ZAMBIANS, NOR OAU HAD RIGHT TO DECIDE WHO WOULD GOVERN THE ANGOLANS, ONLY THEY DID.

5. CHONA THEN SAID HE MADE KEY PITCH IN SAYING IF SOVIETS CONVINCED OF REASONABLENESS OF ZAMBIAN POSITION, THEN SOVIETS WERE INVITED TO TAKE INITIATIVE TO GAIN RATHER THAN LOSE FAVOR IN AFRICAN EYES BY WORKING OUT A FORMULA TO END THE ANGOLAN WAR AND LAY THE GROUND FOR A PEACEFUL, POLITICAL SOLUTION. SOVIETS ALSO ASKED TO ENCOURAGE MPLA TO BE MAGNANIMOUS IN DEALING WITH OTHER MOVEMENTS.

6. I ASKED CHONA IF ZAMBIANS INTENDED TO PUSH THIS SAME LINE IN DIRECT DEMARCHE TO MOSCOW. HE SAID KAUNDA PREFERRED TO AWAIT MOSCOW'S OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO LATEST CONVERSATION, ASSUMING BELAKOLOS CORRECTLY REPORTED AND INTERPRETED THE SECRET

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EXCHANGE. CONTROL WOULD THUS BE MORE EFFECTIVE. CHONA THOUGHT THIRD MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LUSAKA COULD BE DECISIVE.

7. I CALLED CHONA'S ATTENTION TO LATEST AF WIRELESS REPORT ON PRESIDENT FORD'S CONVERSATION WITH NEWSMEN ON DEPARTING VAIL, COLORADO FOR WASHINGTON IN WHICH HE HINTED HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT A COALITION GOVERNMENT. IF THE REPORT WAS TRUE, IT WAS MY PERSONAL ASSUMPTION THAT WE HAD GOTTEN SOME SIGNAL FROM OUR BILATERAL APPROACHES TO MOSCOW. HE HOPED I MIGHT CONFIRM THIS.

8. CHONA THEN ASKED IF THE USG MIGHT PLAY A ROLE ON THE

EVE OF THE OAU SUMMIT. COULD THE SECRETARY SEND A MESSAGE TO OAU SECRETARY ETEKI WHICH MIGHT BE READ AT SUMMIT MEETING IN WHICH US POLICY ON ANGOLA SUMMARIZED AND UPDATED TO INDICATE OUR FULL SUPPORT FOR END OF CONFLICT AND GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. I RAISED QUESTION OF AMIN PROBLEM BUT CHONA INSISTED THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE OUT OF ORDER, RATHER QUITE ACCEPTABLE IN AFRICAN CONTEXT. SAID I WOULD UQN MATTER TO DEPARTMENT.

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 097284

O 030700Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2581

INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 LUSAKA 0008

EXDIS

DAKAR FOR ASST SECTY SCHAUFELLE

9. CHONA THEN ASKED FOR MY COMMENTS ON ZAMBIAN DRAFT OBJECTIVES FOR SUMMIT MEETING, (LUSAKA 2552-NOTAL), SAYING HE URGENTLY NEEDED CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM TO SHARPEN FOCUS AND COVER ALL REALISTIC POSSIBILITIES, EVENMWHOZGH AFFECTIVENESS OF ANY OAU RESOLUTION ON ANGOLA SOMEWHAT IN DOUBT. SAID I WAS STILL AWAITING REPLY FROM WASHINGTON. THEN REFERRING TO DRAFT I ASKED FOLLOWING: WHAT KINDS OF SANCTIONS HAD HE IN MIND? COULD THEY BE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED? CONDEMNING INTERVENTION WAS ONE THING BUT HOW DID HE INTEND TO MAKE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES A REALITY? HAD HE YET SOUNDED OUT CANADIANS, SWEDES, INDIANS AND OTHERS FOR THEIR REACTION TO IDEA OF SUPERVISORY COMMISSION? WHY NOT SEND DELEGATIONS TO FOREIGN CAPITALS BEFORE AS WELL AS AFTER OAU SUMMIT? CHONA VIRTUALLY BEGGED FOR SUBSTANTIVE AS WELL AS EDITORIAL ASSISTANCE, PLEADING LIMITED TIME AND RESOURCES. SAID I WOULD URGENTLY REQUEST WASHINGTON ANALYSIS AND REPLY.

10. CHONA THEN INDICATED HE HAD HAD RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH CHINESE ON ANGOLA, BUT SINCE THEY HAD ALREADY DEPARTED THE SCENE THERE HE WONDERED IF HE SHOULD ENGAGE THEM AT THIS POINT OR INCLUDE PEKING ON ITINERARY OF OAU DELEGATION. I

MADE NO COMMENT.

SECRET

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11. THEN I ASKED CHONA WHY ZAMBIA, TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE AND KENYA HAD NOT GIVEN PUBLICITY TO FACT OF THEIR QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON 4-POINT PROPOSAL FOR OAU SUMMIT WHICH COULD TEND TO HOLD MPLA RECOGNITION IN CHECK. CHONA SAID ZAMBIA WAS ENCOURAGED BY FACT NYERERE JUST RECENTLY URGED THAT BOTSWANA BE BROUGHT INTO AGREEMENT. ZAMBIA ALSO HOPED BOTH TANZANIA AND MOZAMBIQUE WOULD TALK TO THE RUSSIANS ALONG SAME LINES ZAMBIA HAD. BUT THERE WAS DELICACY IN PUSHING THESE COUNTRIES TOO FAR BECAUSE OF THEIR DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. ZAMBIA WAS HOPINGFOR INITIATIVES FROM THEM.

12. COMMENT: CHONA MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT HIS CONCILIATORY TALK WITH SOVIETS WAS WELL PLANNED AND REHEARSED TO APPEAL TO COOL REASON RATHER THAN ANTAGONIZE, EVEN THOUGH ZAMBIANS, HE SAID, DO NOT LIKE RUSSIANS NOR THEIR IDEOLOGY, MOREOVER, ARE CRITICAL OF THEIR "BOLD" INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA AND DIS-TRUSTFUL OF THEIR REAL INTENTIONS. BUT CHONA'S KID GLOVES TREATMENT WAS DELIBERATELY CALCULATED TO OFFER THE RUSSIANS A FACE-SAVING MEANS OF AVOIDING HEAVY AND LONG LASTING AFRICAN OPPROBRIUM. CHONA GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF A MAN WITH HIS FINGERS CROSSED, WHILE HOLDING HIS BREATH THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BACK DOWN FROM SPONSORING A PROTRACTED WAR IN ANGOLA. THE ZAMBIANS ALSO SEEM CONFIDENT THAT GIVEN TIME THE ANGOLANS CAN DEAL WITH THEIR INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS WHILE MAINTAINING THEIR SOVEREIGNTY.

13. ACTION REQUESTED. THAT WASHINGTON REVIEW AND COMMENT ON ZAMBIAN DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR OAU SUMMIT CONTAINED IN LUSAKA'S 2552 WHICH KAUNDA OBVIOUSLY REGARDS AS GRZ CONTRIBUTION TO AGREED DIPLOMATIC EFFORT IN WHICH WE ARE JOINTLY COLLABOR-ATING.
WILKOWSKI

SECRET

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 15 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PFOR
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 JAN 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: saccheem
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976LUSAKA00008
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: LUSAKA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760199/baaespg.tel
Line Count: 203
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: saccheem
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09 APR 2004 by ElyME>; APPROVED <31 AUG 2004 by saccheem>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ZAMBIAN APPEAL TO SOVIETS TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT OF
TAGS: ZA
To: STATE INFO KINSHASA
DAKAR
MOSCOW
LISBON
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

